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Comments and Casenotes
"Accidental Means" In Workmen's Compensation
Furlongv. O'Hearne'
The claimant, a rigger engaged in repair work on a
vessel, strained his back while lifting heavy rotor pumps
in the regular course of his employment. The strain aggravated a congenital spinal malformation, resulting in
subsequent disability. He filed a claim for compensation
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.2 Since the claimant had been performing his
usual routine tasks at the time of the injury, the Deputy
Commissioner ruled that the claimant had failed to show
an" 'accidental injury of a sudden, unusual and unexpected
character, from strain or overexertion'

",'

and denied an

award for compensation.
On appeal, the District Court for the District of Maryland reversed and remanded for the passage of an order
awarding compensation to the claimant. The Court, per
Chief Judge Thomsen, rejected the approach followed by a
substantial minority4 of jurisdictions to the effect that an
"accidental injury'' must be caused by an "accidental
means" or some unusual strain or condition not naturally
and ordinarily incident to the employment,5 and held, in
accordance with the weight of authority,6 that an "accidental result" will suffice.7 Although the injury occurred
1144 F. Supp. 266 (D. Md. 1956), aff'd. per curiam 240 F. 2d 958 (4th
Cir. 1957).
'33 U. S. C. A. (1957) Sees. 901-950.
Supra, n. 1, 268.
Most states use the terms "accidental injury", or injury "by accident"
in their Workmen's Compensation statutes. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

(1952), §37.10; Workmen's Compensation Law Ite-

porter, C. C. H. (1957), §§O001-6054.
ILARsON, op. cit., ibid, §38; 5 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
(Perm. Ed. 1946), §1446; Sinkiewicz v. Lee & Cady, 254 Mich. 218, 236
N. W. 784 (1931) ; Hamilton v. Huebner, 146 Neb. 320, 19 N. W. 2d 552,
163 A. L. R. 1 (1945).
8LARSON, op. cit., supra, n. 4, §38; ScHNEwER, loo. cit., 8upra, n. 5, §1446;
Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes, 1910 A. C. 242, 3 B. W. C. C. 775 (1910) ;
Giguere v. E. B. & A. C. Whiting Co., 107 Vt. 151, 177 A. 313, 98 A. L. R.
196 (1935) ; Gilliland v. Ash Grove Lime & Cement Co., 104 Kan. 771, 180
P. 793 (1919). See the concurring opinion of Seawell, J., in Edwards v.
Piedmont Pub. Co., 227 N. C. 184, 41 S. E. 2d 592, 594 (1947).
The Court also ruled, following the almost universally adopted view,
that even though the claimant was suffering from a pre-existing Infirmity,
the injury is still compensable where the Infirmity or disease was aggravated or Its effects accelerated by an accidental injury arising out of and
In the course of the employment. See: 58 AM. JuR. 749, Workmen's Compensation, §247; Gas Equipment Corp. v. Baldwin, 152 Md. 321, 136 A. 644
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while the employee was performing his normal routine
tasks, and was not caused by any external force, slip or
fall, it was nevertheless "accidental" since it was an unintended, unexpected and fortuitous result of the claimant's
work.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has taken a different
view and, in construing Section 14 of Article 101,8 has
aligned itself with the minority approach. It is submitted
that, whatever may have been the source of the "accidental
means" doctrine in other jurisdictions, the rule in Maryland
evolved through a compounding of judicial error. A careful
analysis of the Maryland decisions would seem to indicate
that an overreaching dictum in Slacum v. Jolley,9 flatly
applied to materially different factual situations presented
in later cases, resulted in an overly fine and technical rule;
the effect has been to remove a small but significant category of injuries from the protection of the Workmen's
Compensation Law. The result seems wholly disconsonant
with the broad remedial purpose of the statute.
In the Slacum case, an "auto-bus" driver became ill
from the heat of the day in driving his regular route and
died within a few days, apparently of heat prostration.
The Court of Appeals, in denying a compensation award,
held that there had been no "accidental injury", since the
prostration was not shown to have been caused by "unusual
and extraordinary conditions in the employment which
cannot be regarded as naturally and ordinarily incident
thereto."' 10 The facts, the Court said, were insufficient to
show that the conditions of the deceased's employment
were different from those affecting the general public in
the neighborhood.
The Court would seem to have gone too far. To be compensable under the Maryland statute, an injury must not
only be "accidental", it must also "arise out of" the em(1927) ; Geipe, Inc. v. Collett, 172 Md. 165, 190 A. 836, 109 A. L. R. 887
(1937).
Note that the Maryland statute now provides for an apportionment of
the disability as between the pre-existing infirmity and the accident, and
compensation is awarded only for the proportion of the disability attributable to the accident. 8 Md. Code (1957), Art. 101, §36(7). See: Cabell
Con. Blk. Co. v. Yarborough, 192 Md. 360, 64 A. 2d 292 (1949) ; Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. Ruff, 203 Md. 387, 101 A. 2d 218 (1953) ; and Bethlehem Steel
Co. v. Munday, 212 Md. 214, 129 A. 2d 162 (1957).
"Every employer . . . shall pay . . . compensation . . . for the disability or death of his employee resulting from an accidental per8onal
injury sustained by the employee arising out of and in the course of his
employment . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Now 8 Md. Code (1957), Art. 101, §15. See also: §67(6).
'153 Md. 343, 138 A. 244 (1927).
lIbid, 351.
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ployment; 11 the two are separate and distinct requirements.
The latter is a causal requirement: the injury must be
caused by some factor or condition of the employment; if
it results from something unconnected with the claimant's
work or working conditions, the "arising out of" requirement is not met. 2
A close analysis of the facts and opinion of the Slacum
case seems to indicate that it was this latter requirement,
and not the "accidental" requirement, which was the real
basis of the Court's decision. Nothing in the evidence indicated that the requirements of his employment subjected
the claimant to any greater heat than was suffered by the
general public. There was no factor traceable to or "arising
out of" the employment which caused the injury. 3 This
would appear to be the crux of the Court's decision; but in
erroneously addressing its overly broad dictum to the
"accidental" requirement rather than to the "arising out
of" requirement, the Slacum court unwittingly set the
stage for a series of judicial misapplications of Judge Offut's
language in the cases that followed.
Miskowiak v. Bethlehem Steel Co.'4 extended the
Slacum rationale to a factual situation it was never intended or designed to cover. The deceased employee had
worked in a steel mill for six years, removing metal bars
from a series of furnaces which generated considerable
heat. The work was alwoys of a strenuous and arduous
nature. At the close of a hot and humid day in April, he
collapsed in pain and succumbed to heat prostration. The
Court of Appeals was unable to meet the Slacum requirement that the prostration be caused by "unusual and extraordinary conditions in the employment . . . not naturally
and ordinarily incident thereto." Since the nature of the
n Supra, n.
22

8.
"An injury 'arises out of' employment when, after consideration of
all the facts and circumstances of the case, it is apparent to the rational mind that there was a causal connection between the conditions
under which the work is required to be performed and the ensuing
injury . .. [The Workmen's Compensation Act] should not be so construed as to allow compensation in any case in which the injury which
is the basis of the claim cannot be 'attributed to some service or act in
the employment or found to be reasonably incidental thereto, but ensues
from a hazard to which the workman would have been equally exposed
apart from his employment." Consol. Engineering Co. v. Feikin, 188
Md. 420, 425, 52 A. 2d 913 (1947).
"These facts, separately or together, are insufficient to show that
Jolley's condition was caused by his employment, or that the conditions of his employment were different from those affecting the
general public in that neighborhood at that time, . . . [n]or can we
assume from his physical condition alone that it was due to his employment." Slacum v. Jolley, 153 Md. 343, 352, 138 A. 244 (1927).
156 Md. 690, 145 A. 199 (1929).
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job uniformly called for strenuous muscular exertion in
the artificial heat generated by the furnaces, the Court
found no unusual or extraordinary working conditions at
the time of the injury and recovery was denied.
But unlike Slacum, the "arising out of" requirement or
causal connection between the employment and the injury
was clearly met in the Miskowiak situation; the prostration
resulted not merely from the general heat of the day, but
primarily from the intense heat thrown off by the furnaces
and from the strenuous muscular exertion required by the
job. It was rather the "accidental" requirement which
faced the Court. Since the injury was a fortuitous unintended consequence of the employee's labor, the necessary
"accidental" quality would appear to be adequately met. 5
But in flatly applying the Slacum dictum in statute-like
fashion to a materially different factual situation, the
Miskowiak court evolved that dictum into an "accidental
means" requirement. 6 Recovery was denied on the ground
that the employee had merely been performing his routine
tasks under the normal conditions of his employment.
It is submitted that the legal consequence of this rationale is to impose a requirement of assumption of risk
upon the employee who is injured in the normal routine
of his daily work. The more strenuous and arduous the
work and the conditions of the employment, the less likely
the chance of recovery when those conditions result in an
injury or illness. The Miskowiak case, by erroneously applying the Slacum dictum to the "accidental" requirement,
thus resulted in a preservation of one of the very doctrines
of the common law which the Workmen's Compensation
Law was designed to abolish, 7 with its consequent harsh
and inequitable results.
"Ruling on a factual situation closely paralleling Miskowiak, Judge
Parker, not bound by the Maryland state court decisions, rejected the
Slacum dictum:
"And we think it equally clear that heat prostration resulting from
the conditions of employment, as was found by the deputy commissioner
in this case, is compensable under the statute without reference to
whether there was any unusual or extraordinary condition in the employment not naturally and ordinarily incident thereto. The statute
says nothing about unusual or extraordinary conditions; and
there is no reasonable basis for reading such words into the statute."
Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Clark, 59 F. 2d 595, 597 (4th Cir. 1932).
"
"The employee had been engaged in the routine performance of
his daily labor, and had completed his days work without receiving
any injury by impact or contact, or as the result of an unusual muscular exertion or unexpected movement." Supra, n. 14, 695.
"Preamble to Md. Laws 1914, Ch. 800, p. 1429; 8 Md. Code (1957), Art.
101, §15; Tilghman Co. v. Conway, 150 Md. 525, 537, 133 A. 593 (1926);
Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 183 Md. 674, 677, 39 A. 2d 858 (1944) ; Hart
v. Sealtest, 186 Md. 183, 193, 46 A. 2d 293 (1946).
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The "accidental means" doctrine was extended from the
limited heat prostration situation into the more significant
"routine exertion" area in Atlantic Coast Shipping Co. v.
Stasiak,8 where a stevedore sustained a hernia while throwing tin plate to a fellow workman. Applying the SlacumMiskowiak rationale, the Court denied recovery as a matter of law, since the claimant had been engaged in the
ordinary
routine work of a stevedore at the time of the
19
injury.
Again, the "arising out of" requirement was clearly
satisfied, since the injury resulted from the work required
of the employee. Applying an "accidental means" test to
deny recovery in such a case seems technical 20 and unrealistic in view of the broad remedial purpose of the
Workmen's Compensation Law.2 ' That the employee must
assume the risk inherent in the nature of his job is plainly
evident in the factual result achieved.
Heil v. Linck 2 and Jackson v. Ferree"' soon provided
a firm foundation in Maryland law for the application of
158 Md. 349, 148 A. 452 (1930).
1The Court cited the Slacum dictum, and held that similarly in this

case, "there was no evidence that the injury was caused by any unusual
strain or by any condition not incident to claimant's employment." Ibid,
351.
11If the hernia had resulted from a slight slip on the part of the claimant,
the Court would have found no difficulty in awarding compensation. Cf.
Coal Co. v. Chisholm, 163 Md. 49, 161 A. 276 (1932), where the claimant
incurred a hernia while performing his routine duties in a coal mine.
Noting that the Stasiak decision precluded recovery in such a situation
for lack of an unusual strain or condition, the Court of Appeals held that
testimony below that the employee had slipped provided sufficient evidence
of an accident. Quaere: Whether this innocuous feature should provide
a legal turning point, the presence or absence of which may determine
the awarding of compensation?
"The legislation is remedial in character, designed and intended to
afford a measure of relief to employer and employee engaged in extrahazardous work from the waste consequent upon injury and disability
to workmen engaged therein by integrating such losses with the cost
of production, and no narrow, technical, or quibbling construction of
its language should be permitted to frustrate that intention, or hinder
or embarrass the efficient operation of the law." Owners' Realty Co.
v. Bailey, 153 Md. 274, 284, 138 A. 235 (1927).
Compare the more liberal decision in Construction Co. v. Griffith, 154 Md.
55, 139 A. 548 (1927), where the Court was apparently not confronted with
the technical requirement of the then recent Slacum v. Jolley case.
170 Md. 640, 180 A. 555 (1936). A meat-cutter worked in refrigerated
rooms for short periods during the working day. The shifts in temperature
between the cooling rooms and the hot outside air proved too great a strain
for his already weak heart. The Court of Appeals, following the Slacum,
Miskowiak, and Stasiak cases, reversed a compensation award. Three of
the eight judges dissented.
173 Md. 400, 196 A. 107 (1938). An automobile mechanic suffered a
hernia while putting a rear wheel on a truck, when the wheel "stuck" and
jarred him. Since he had merely been carrying out his customary duties,
the Court of Appeals affirmed a directed verdict for the employer, following Heil v. Linck, 8upra, n. 22.
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the misconceived "accidental means" doctrine to other
routine exertion cases. The Court in Beadle v. Bethlehem
Steel Co.,24 confronted with facts almost identical to the
Miskowiak25 case, held for the employer as a matter of
law. At least in retrospect, "assumption of risk" seems
all too apparent in these harsh and stringent decisions.
The Court of Appeals does not seem unaware of the
defects inherent in its "accidental means" requirement.
Judge Offutt, the very author of the Slacum dictum, dissented vigorously in Heil v. Linck 6 from the result achieved
by his own legal offspring. Straining to find some factor
distinguishing the Heil case from its predecessors, he spoke
of the purpose and policy of the Workmen's Compensation
Law:
"To accomplish its beneficent purpose, it was essential that it be interpreted and administered liberally to effect its intent; every consideration, social, economic, and humane, favored that policy, and it was
clearly adopted as the policy of this court. The conclusion reached in this case appears to me to reverse
it, and to favor in lieu thereof a narrower, technical,
formalistic policy, in conflict with
the plain, sound, and
'27
healthful policy of the statute.

On other occasions, the Court has shown extreme liberality" and has utilized somewhat artificial distinctions2"
-4172 Md. 541, 193 A. 240 (1937).
156 Md. 690, 145 A. 199 (1929).
2Supra,
n. 22, 647.
NSupra, n. 22, 653-4. Ibid, 653, 654.
2In
both Schemmel v. Gatch & Sons Etc. Co., 164 Md. 671, 166 A. 39
(1933), and Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Zapf, 192 Md. 403, 64 A. 2d 139
(1949), the evidence tended to show that the claimants had merely been
engaged in performing their customary and routine duties when Injured.
But the Court, delving deep into the factual circumstances, found sufficient
evidence of "accidental injury" to go to the jury.
2An
elderly road patrolman had been employed to trim grass and clear
trash along the roadway. On an unseasonably hot day, he was taken from
his usual light duties to load cobblestones onto a truck. The heat of the
day and the weight of the stones proved too strenuous for his weak resistance; he succumbed to heat prostration and died. The Court of Appeals
held that while the conditions at the time of the injury might have been
usual -and ordinary for one employed to load trucks, they were unusual and
extraordinary for one usually engaged in lighter duties. State Roads
Oommn. v. Reynolds, 164 Md. 539, 165 A. 475 (1933).
The distinction appears rather tenuous. It would seem that under a
proper application of an "accidental means" rationale, the necessary "accidental quality" must lie in the nature of the occurrence causing the
injury, and should not be predicated upon the type of work normally performed by the employee.
See also: Baking Co. v. Wlckham, 178 Md. 381, 13 A. 2d 771 (1940),
where the Court employed this same device in similar fashion.
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in striving to supply an "accidental means" sufficient to
permit an escape from the harsh results which invariably
follow upon its "routine duties" rationale.
But nothing short of overrule can prevent the applicability of case law that has become so well established.
In Kelly-Springfield Co. v. Daniels,0 the Court, conceding
the great weight of authority to be contra, denied recovery
where a claimant ruptured an intervertebral disc while
lifting an air bag in the routine discharge of his duties.
In Stancliff v. H. B. Davis Co.,"1 the Court thoroughly reviewed the Maryland cases, and rejected (perhaps somewhat reluctantly) the more liberal test of "accidental result" followed by the overwhelming majority of federal
and state courts. By 1956, the Court required but a few
short paragraphs in Rieger v. Wash. Sub. San. Comm. 2 to
deny recovery for a back injury where the evidence failed
to show "some unusual strain 33or exertion or some unusual
condition in the employment.1
The Maryland cases, then, in this small but significant
area of Workmen's Compensation law, preserve the doctrine of assumption of risk and deny recovery on the basis
of a technical and unrealistic rationale which was itself
conceived in error. To deem non-accidental the sort of injury involved in these cases is to defeat the very purpose
and intent of the statute.
"Such an injury is accidental in that it is unforeseen
and unexpected. If it results from the conditions under
which the work is carried on, there is no reason why
it should not be held compensable. In such case, it is
one of the casualties of the business; and it is the purpose of the compensation statutes to place the burden
of such casualties upon8' the
business and not upon the
4
unfortunate employee.
Although it is not without precedent for courts to correct prior judicial errors (and ignore stare decisis) where
10199 Md. 156, 85 A. 2d 795 (1952). See also Caled Products Co., Inc.
v. Sausser, 199 Md. 514, 86 A. 2d 904 (1952).
8208 Md. 191, 117 A. 2d 577 (1955). The decision would seem better
Justified on the ground of insufficient causal connection between the employment and the injury.
81211 Md. 214, 126 A. 2d 598 (1956).
- Ibid, 216.
" Baltimore & o. R. Co. v. Clark, 59 F. 2d 595, 598 (4th Cir. 1932), quoted
in Furlong v. O'Hearne, 144 F. Supp. 266, 268 (D. Md. 1956), the principal
case noted herein.
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the demands of social policy are strong, 5 they do not usually overturn a body of decisions so well-imbedded in the
current of judicial precedent. The Maryland Legislature
has already acted to remedy the defects arising from the
application of the "accidental means" rationale in occupational disease cases, 36 and apparently in hernial7 and sunstroke" injuries. The still unremedied routine exertion
cases remain for its consideration.
NELSON

B.

SEIDMAN

Right Of Mortgagee To Sue Assuming Grantee
Of Mortgage Debt
Rosenberg v. Rolling Inn, Inc.'
Plaintiffs operated coin machines in a supper club managed by Villa Donna, Inc. In July of 1949 the Villa Donna
corporation executed a mortgage, payable in one year, on
the real and personal property of the supper club to secure
a debt of $5,200, owed by Villa Donna to the plaintiffs. The
mortgage was never recorded. In November of 1949, Villa
Donna, Inc. sold the supper club under a written contract
to three individual vendees who were the promoters and
later became the first stockholders of the defendant corporation. The contract provided that the vendees would
assume the mortgage obligation owed by Villa Donna, Inc.
to the plaintiffs. One week later, defendant corporation
ratified the assumption. However, since no written evidence of this ratification could be found, defendant repudiated its obligation and, on June 2, 1951, ceased to make
payments. Plaintiff brought this suit at law for the balance
due on the mortgage debt. Defendant pleaded the Statute
of Frauds. On judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appealed.
The Court of Appeals, in reversing the lower court, held
that the Statute of Frauds did not apply since the defendant made its promise to the original debtor. "Where the
promise to pay a debt or obligation is not to the creditor,
'For example see: Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss.
906, 55 So. 2d 142, 25 A. L. R. 2d 12 (1951); also, Avellone v. St. Johns
Hospital, 165 Oh. St. 467, 135 N. E. 2d 410 (1956); Noel v. Menninger
Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934 (1954); Pierce v. Yakima Valley
Memorial Hospital Ass'n., 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P. 2d 765 (1953).
6Md. Code (1957), Art. 101, Secs. 22-30; see Gunter v. Sharp & Dohme,
159 Md. 438, 151 A. 134 (1930), and Cambridge Mfg. Co. v. Johnson, 160
Md. 248, 153 A. 283 (1931).
8 Md. Code (1957), Art. 101, §36(5) (a).
T
Ibid, §67(6).
1212 Md. 552, 129 A. 2d 924 (1957).

